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Experimental Tests of The Endowment Effect* 
Introduction: The Endowment Effect 
Individual decision making studies have shown that human subjects reveal an 
asymmetric response pattern toward losses (loss aversion) as contrasted with gains measured 
relative to any individual's initial status quo position (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
Consequently, if one's initial wealth endowment is Xo, then the hypothesis is that the utility 
function, u(·), has the property (among others) that u'(Xo) > u'(X;); 1& marginal utility 
from the left is above marginal utility from the right for ~ initial Xo' Although Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) were concerned with prospect theory as a modification of utility theory 
for risky decision, in a fundamental extension Thaler (1980) argued that "many of the 
elements of prospect theory can be used in developing descriptive choice models in 
deterministic settings." (Thaler, 1980, p. 41). Thaler observed that the utility property, u'(XQ) 
> u'(X;) implies that out-of-pocket costs are more heavily weighted in utility assessments 
than opportunity costsl;.i&. a forgone gain has lower utility value than the actual loss of the 
same amount. This cognitive underweighting of opportunity costs by the individual was 
referred to as the "endowment effect," and was used to explain a number of questionnaire 
survey examples. 
Subsequently, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991; hereafter KKT) suggested that 
the discrepancy between willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA), widely 
observed in hypothetical surveys and in motivated exchange experiments, were all 
manifestations of the endowment effect. (See KKT, Table 1 for a summary). However, 
they argue (KKT, p. 1327) that the endowment effect does not apply when goods are 
purcha.sed for resale rather than use. Thus there is no endowment effect for the retail firm, 
only for the consumer purchasing the firm's goods. Similarly, they note that it does not 
apply to the exchange of tokens (or rights) to which private redemption values, or induced 
values, have been assigned by the experimenter (Smith, 1976). Empirically, they show this 
to be the case in experiments establishing an endowment effect for Cornell and other coffee 
mugs but not for induced value tokens. Kahneman and Tversky (1991) subsequently showed 
how these empirical results could he used to provide a reference-dependent model of 
preferences. 
The results of nine experiments are reported by KKT. Some of these were exchange 
experiments, others were choice experiments using the Becker, DeGroot and Marschak 
(1964) (hereafter BDM) procedure. In section I we discuss their choice experiments, 
introduce our modifications in their procedures, and present the new results. In section II 
we discuss their exchange experiments and present the results of ten new exchange 
experiments using the uniform price double auction mechanism which, because of its real 
time information feedback features, achieves high efficiency in single period exchange. 
I. Choice Tests of the Endowment Effect 
The KKT Experiments 
In their typical choice experiment an undergraduate class is divided into two equal 
parts. Half the subjects are randomly designated sellers and the others become buyers. 
University coffee mugs (Cornell, Simon Fraser, or University of British Columbia), costing 
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about $6 in the local University bookstore, are then distributed to the sellers, and all buyers 
are given the opportunity to examine a mug. The following forms are then executed by all 
sellers [buyers] (See KKT, p. 178 for their instructions). 
I Will Sell I Will Keep 
[Buy] [Not Buy] the Mug 
If the price is SO 
If the price is SO.50 
If the price is $9.50 
As an example of a subject's response on the above form a seller might indicate a 
preference for keeping the mug for all prices at or below $5.00, selling it at all prices above 
$5.00. The subject's WTA would then be assessed at 55.25. 
After the forms were executed a random (equally likely) price was drawn from the 
list between $0 and $9.50, and exchanges based on this price were conducted by the 
experimenter.2 The results of their experiment 5 were typical of those reported by KKT: 
The median selling price, $5.75, is more than double the median buying price, which is 
consistent with an endowment effect. But, as recognized by KKT, this interpretation is 
clouded by the fact that the experiment did not control Jor the income effect in standard 
preference theory. Although sellers were given their mugs, buyers were required to use 
their own funds. Any income effect is thought to be 'small' relative to the WTP-\VTA 
disparity shown by the KKT and other experiments. But standard theory tells us nothing 
quantitative about the magnitude of 'small.' 
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To address this objection KKT (pp. 179-180) develop an ingenious variation on the 
above experimental design. Instead of two groups they use~: sellers, buyers and 
choosers. The sellers/buyers make the same sales/purchase decisions as before, while the 
choosers are asked to choose at each prospective price between the mug or cash. Thus 
sellers are given a mug, and choosers are given the right to either a mug or cash as they 
choose; any income effect on sellers as distinct from buyers, should also apply to choosers. 
The difference is that, according to the KKT implementation of the endowment effect, 
sellers own the mug. choosers do not. 
KKT report median prices for the three groups fOT each of two experiments (KKT, 
experiments 6 and 7, p. 179-180). Mean prices for their data are shown in the first two rows 
of Table 1. The result is clear: choosers behave much more like buyers than like sellers, 
although choosers value mugs sixty percent more highly than buyers. 
Choice Experiments Controlling for Differential Instruction Effects 
Since it was these last two experiments that were critical to the hypothesized 
endowment effect (they controlled for any income effect), we conducted four experiments 
each with 24 subjects (8 in each group; N = 96 subjects, total) motivated by the three-group 
design. However, we made several instructional changes which, we conjectured, might be 
of substance. 
Psychologically, 'buying', 'selling' and 'choosing' are distinct emotive terms. The first 
two are laden with strategic connotations -- buyers are motivated to buy low, sellers to sell 
high -- while 'choosing' appears to be not so laden. To control for effects due only to 
4 
differences in the KKT wording of the tasks for each of the three groups of subjects we 
neutralized our instructions so that each group was presented with a choice task, not 
'buying,' 'selling' and 'choice' tasks. Our instructions, common for all subjects, and the 
choice sheet for each of the three groups, now referred to with antiseptic evenness as Group 
1, Group 2, and Group 3, are shown in the appendix. Each member of Group 1 is an owner 
of an Arizona Wildcat Mug, and their task is to choose, for each amount of money (nQ1 a 
"price"), between retaining their mug, or accepting the additional amount of money. Each 
member of Group 2 is designated as having the right to choose between accepting a mug 
or retaining an amount of money out of their earnings in a previous experiment in the s~me 
session. Finally, each person in Group 3 is designated as'having the right to choose between 
accepting a mug or accepting an additional amount of money. Thus, all subjects are 
symmetrically described as choosers, but under different initial conditions, and no reference 
is made to 'buying,' 'selling,' or to 'prices.' This procedure should eliminate any instructional 
effect in applying different descriptions to the different subject groups. 
All of our experiments were run at the end of two simultaneous posted offer market 
experiments (6 buyers, 6 sellers in each), reported in Franciosi.u (1994). The positions 
of Groups 1, 2 and 3 were assigned at random among the 24 subjects. All subjects were 
paid their earnings in cash at the end of the market experiments. Earnings ranged from 
$8.75 to $44.50, providing all Group 2 subjects with adequate funds to give up for a mug if 
they chose. 
5 
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The mean monetary amounts ('prices') for each of Groups 1,2 and 3 are shown in 
the sc~cond data row of Table 1. The mugs were priced at $9.95 (price tags removed) in the 
campus bookstore. 
From Table 1 it will be seen that our subjects reported a substantially lower Group 
1, WTA, a somewhat higher WTP, and a higher Group 3, WTA, than did the KKT subjects. 
Substituting a choice task for the buying and selling tasks appears to narrow the WTA/WTP 
discre:pancy. But from Table 2 row 1, the t test shows that all pairwise comparisons of our 
three groups come from different distributions. Row 2 compares the KKT.results with ours 
and shows that the reduction in selling prices and the increase in buying prices are 
significant using the Wilcoxon test. Since these comparisons did not control for differences 
due to subjects and experimenters, we cannot attribute them only to the treatment 
differences. 
We also asked if being in the role of buyer or seller in the prior market experiments 
affected the value revealed for a mug. The effect was insignificant using the Epps-Singleton 
test «(~ = 0.37). 
Finally, we asked if the amount paid to subjects in the prior market experiments 
affected their revealed values in the mug experiment. A regression of the latter on the 
former yielded no significant relationship (R2 = 0.007). This suggests that any 'house 
money' income effect on mug valuation is nil (ThaIer and Johnson, 1990). 
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Table 1 
Mean WfA and WTP 
for University Emblem Mugs 
WfA WTP WTA WTA-SI WTA-SI Sample 
Experiment Sellers Buyers Choosers IWTP-B I WfA-C size, N 
$6.89 $1.91 $3.05 3.61 1.60 194 
WfA WTP WfA WTA-1/ WTA-1/
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 / WTP-2 WfA-3 
$5.36 $2.19 $3.88 2.45 1.38 120 
a. Mugs and subjects from Simon Fraser University. 
b. Mugs and subjects from University of British Columbia. Price tags 
were left on the mugs. 
c. Mugs and subjects from University of Arizona. All subjects make 
choices: In Group 1 each is endowed with a mug; Group 2, each is 
endowed only with the money earned in a pre-experiment; Group 3, 
each is endowed with the right to choose either a mug or additional 
money. 
-----------------------------------------,..
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Table 2 
Group Distribution Differences 
and Comparisons with KKT Results 
for Buyers, Sellers and Choosers 
using t tests 
Hypotheses 
G1 = G2 G2 = G3 G3 = G1 
Group 1-3 
t = 7.33 
Q = 0.000 
t = -4.01 
Q = 0.000 
t = -2.98 
Q = 0.004 
G1 = S G2 = B G3 = C 
KKT 
S, Band C 
Groups 
t = -3.73 
Cl = 0.00 
t = 1.10 
Cl = 0.27 
t = 2.12 
ex = 0.04 
n. Exchange Tests of the Endowment Effect 
The KKT Exchange Experiments 
In addition to their BDM choice experiments, KKT report the results of several 
exchange experiments. The typical experiment proceeds as follows. Of 2N subjects, N are 
randomly designated buyers, and N are randomly designated sellers. The latter are each 
endowed with a mug; the former use their own money. Buyers each submit a bid price to 
buy a mug, sellers each submit an offer price to sell their mug. Their 'bids' or 'offers' are 
solicited by asking each subject to choose between a price and a mug for a series of prices 
as in the BDM procedure except that the range starts at $0.25 and goes up in increments 
of $0.50. The bids (WTP's) of the subjects are then ordered from highest to lowest, while 
the offers (WTA's) are similarly ordered from lowest to highest. The intersection of these 
revealed supply and demand schedules determines the price and quantity exchanged. If 
there are no endowment or income effects, then due to the random allocation of subjects 
to the buy or sell category the supply schedule of those given the mugs should be the 
symmetrical mirror image of the demand schedule for those not given the cups; ik 
(demand) E D(P*) = S(P*) =N - D(P*) E (supply) and D(P*) = N/2. Consequently, the 
prediction is that N/2 mugs will trade. For example (KKT, pp. 170-173) with 44 subjects, 
and N =22 buyers and 22 sellers, 11 mugs are predicted to trade. In fact between one and 
four trade at prices between $4.25 and $4.75. Although there are several bid/offer trials, 
only one is chosen at random to be binding. Table 3 summarizes their results for induced 
value tokens, mugs, and pens for all trials in four experiments. 
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Table 3 
Number Observed Predicted Number Observed Predicted 
Experiment Trial Subjects Object Price Trades Trades Experiment Trial Subjects Object1 Trades Trades 
I I 44 Tokens $3.75 12 11 3 I 26 Tokens 5 6.5 
I 2 44 Tokens $4.75 11 11 3 2 26 Pens 2 6.5 
I 3 44 Tokens $4.25 10 11 3 3 26 Pens 2 6.5 
3 4 26 Pens 2 6.5 
3 5 26 Pens I 6.5 
I 4 44 Mugs $4.25 4 11 
I 5 44 Mugs $4.75 I 11 
I 6 44 Mugs $4.50 2 I I 
I 7 44 Mugs $4.25 2 I I 4 I 74 Tokens 15 18.5 
4 2 74 Tokens 16 18.5 
4 3 74 Mugs 6 18.5 
I 8 44 Pens $1.25 4 11 4 4 74 Mugs 4 18.5 
I 9 44 Pens $1.25 5 11 4 5 72 Mugs 4 18 
I 10 44 Pens $1.25 4 11 4 6 73 Mugs 8 18 
I I I 44 Pens $1.25 5 11 4 7 74 Mugs 8 18.5 
2 I 38 Tokens $3.75 10 10 
2 2 38 Tokens $4.75 9 10 
2 3 38 Tokens $4.25 7 8 
L. q 
-'0 MUgS JlI./) 
-' ~.) I. Prices are not reported in experiments 3 and 4. In these 
2 5 38 Mugs $2.25 3 9.5 experiments "the subjects were asked (or minimum selling or 
2 6 38 Mugs $2.25 2 9.5 maximum buying prices rather than answer the series of 'yes 
2 7 38 Mugs $2.25 2 9.5 or no' questions used in Experiments I and 2" (KKT, p. 175). 
2 8 38 Binoculars $1.25 4 9.5 
2 9 38 Binoculars $ .75 4 9.5 
2 10 38 Binoculars $ .75 3 9.5 
2 I I 38 Binoculars $ .75 3 9.5 
According to the endowment hypothesis the predicted number of trades will be 
realized for induced value tokens, since one is simply trading dollars for identical dollar 
claims: in fact, on average there is undertrading (in experiments 2,3 and 4 but not 1). This 
is consistent with other studies showing a tendency to underreveal (token) demand and/or 
supply by subjects in uniform price sealed bid institutions (Smith, et aI, 1982). But with 
consumer goods (mugs, pens) there is substantial undertrading -- much less than half the 
predicted volume is observed to trade.3 H there are income effects, then the demand by 
subjects not endowed with mugs, d(P) < D(P), the demand by the endowed subjects. Hence 
d(P*) = N - D(P*) < N -d(P*) and d(P*) < N/2. But our finding reported above, showing 
no income effect, suggests that this cannot account for the results in Table 3.4 
We should add that the KKT procedure does produce an incentive to underreveal 
demand (supply). When subjects are asked to choose between an object and a price, they 
know that their crossover price is, in effect, a bid price for a buyer and an ask price for a 
seller. Then "the market price was the point at which the elicited supply and demand curves 
intersected." (KKT, footnote 2, p. 171). This procedure means that if the highest accepted 
ask, AH < Bv the lowest accepted bid, then there are many prices that clear the market. 
The typical (fair?) procedure is to set the clearing price at Pc = (AH +BL)/2. The mug 
price in trial 6 of experiment 1 is an example in which Pc is half way between the discrete 
values $4.25 and $4.75 on the subject's choice form. If subjects believe that AH < BL is a 
possible outcome it pays any seller (who may turn out to be the marginal seller) to 'ask' 
more than her WTA (or marginal buyer to 'bid' below his WTP). Since the distribution of 
the consumer good object values is highly uncertain, and unknown toboth the subjects and 
11 
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the c~xperimenters, the incentive to misrepresent may be more pronounced than with tokens. 
This is noted by KKT (p. 177) and is the important reason why they invoke the BDM choice 
procedure discussed above. 
The Uniform Price Double Auction Mechanism 
There exists a trading institution which results in a single block trade at a uniform 
price: but which has the real time information display, feedback, characteristics of the 
continuous double auction, called the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA); it has been 
extensively studied in the laboratory, (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1993; Friedman, 1991). 
Bids and offers are displayed in real time, and continuously crossed to yield a provisional 
common price and corresponding quantity while the market is open. When the trading 
period ends, all trades become binding at the price and quantity standing at the close. This 
institution is particularly well suited for examining the exchange predictions of the 
endowment effect because it has been shown to have excellent revelation properties for 
marginal units, resulting in fully efficient exchange quantities. 
Table 4 and Figure 1 illustrate the state of all bid and offer realizations at the market 
close for a typical trading period in an UPDA experiment (period 12, experiment 7302 
below). The first column lists the ID of each buyer, followed by that buyer's bid (column 
2). The rank order (high to low of bids, low to high of offers) is shown in column 3. 
Column 4 displays each seller's offer followed by the seller's ID in column 5. The horizontal 
line below the 6th ranked bid and offer separates the accepted bids and offers above from 
the rejected bids and offers below the line. The accepted bids and offers form contracts at 
12 
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Table 4 
Bid, Offers and Trades 
UPDA Experiment 7302, Period 12 
ID No. Bid Rank Offer 10 No. 
2 400 1 220 19 
6 325 2 290 24 
9 310 3 300 22 
4 310 4 300 21 
11 301 5 300 17 
12 300 6 300 27 
10 311 7 329 25 
7 300 8 330 26 
1 300 9 347 18 
8 280 10 362 23 
5 270 11 380 20 
3 200 12 
1 
Figure 1 
Graph of Induced Supply and Demand, 
and of Bid/Offer Realizations 
UPDA Experiment 7302, Period 12 
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a uniform price (300 cents in Table 4). Several alternative information feedback and price 
algorithm procedures for UPDA have been studied. We use the procedure in which subjects 
see displayed in real time only the best rejected bid and offer (311 and 329 in Table 4) not 
the accepted set of bids and offers. This puts maximum pressure on the outside traders to 
reach agreement, and has been found to yield the highest exchange volume and market 
efficiency (McCabe, Rassenti and Smith, 1993, p. 320). 
In Figure 1 the demand bids (supply offers) are plotted as solid line steps. Also 
plotted, as broken line steps, are the induced value or cost of each trader. Note the 
substantial value/cost underrevelation, which does not thereby impede the efficient exchange 
of six units. 
Mug Exchange Using the Uniform Price Mechanism 
We report the results of two series of experiments. In each experiment 24 different 
subjects were randomly assigned to groups of 12 buyers and 12 sellers. Each series was 
divided into Parts 1 and 2 (See Table 5). In Part 1 of Series 1 each buyer was assigned a 
value and each seller a cost by a random draw with replacement from the uniform 
distribution on [0, $9.99] at the beginning of each of 10 (or 12) trading periods. This 
baseline served as a training session in UPDA. All periods lasted 4 minutes. In Part 2, 
Series 1 and 2, each buyer was endowed with a $9.99 cash balance which was theirs to keep 
if no mug was purchased; each seller was endowed with a University of Arizona emblem 
mug priced at $9.95 in the University bookstore and was theirs to keep if not sold. Each 
subject was paid in cash all of his/her earnings from the induced value UPDA training 
15 
Part 1 
Part 2 
Number of 
Experiments (subjects) 
Table 5 
Description of Treatments in 
UPDA Exchange Experiments 
Series 1 
Induced 
Values [0, $9.99]; 
random equilibrium; 
4 minute periods 
Buyers: $9.99 each. 
Sellers: one mug each; 
4 minute periods 
4 (96) 
Series 2 
Induced 
Values [0, 59.99]; 
constant equilibrium; 
4 minutes periods 
Buyers: $9.99 each. 
Sellers: one mug each; 
4 and 6 minute periods 
$9.95 tag left on mug 
6 (144) 
experiments in Part 1 of each of the sessions. In series 2, Part 1 used the constant volume 
equilibrium environment shown in Figure 1; in each period a random constant was added 
to each value, and the values randomly assigned to individuals. Part 2 of series 2 was like 
that of series 1 except that the price tag ($9.95) was left on each mug, and this was pointed 
out to the subjects. This was intended as a treatment to reduce uncertainty concerning the 
cash or market value of the mug in each group. Also in series 2 we increased the trading 
time for the mug exchange from 4 to 6 minutes in four of the six experiments. This is 
because it appeared that the subjects were still adjusting their bids and offers when the 
period ended after four minutes. Table 5 summarizes the experimental design. 
Results of Exchange Experiments 
Table 6 lists the predicted competitive equilibrium volume, and corresponding 
observed trading volume in periods 1-10 for the random equilibrium induced value 
environment. The induced value results are those recorded for periods 1-10 in four 
experiments. The mug exchange volume is recorded in period 11 for each experiment, with 
the corresponding UPDA price shown in parenthesis. 
Table 7 lists the volume data for the experiments using a constant equilibrium 
volume environment for periods 1-12 in the UPDA training baseline. Period 13 records the 
volume in the subsequent mug exchange experiments, with the UPDA mug price shown in 
parenthesis. 
In both Tables 6 and 7 it can be seen that as we move from the induced value 
exchange to mug exchange, volume relative to the prediction is decreased. But comparing 
17 
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Table 6 
Volume Traded in UPDA Experiments 
Series I, Random Equilibrium2 
UPDA 
Experiment1 5282 6012 7162 7232 
Trading Volume Volume Volume Volume 
Period Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed 
I 8 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 
2 7 8 6 5 5 5 6 7 
3 6 6 4 4 6 6 6 5 
4 8 7 5 5 7 6 7 6 
5 4 5 7 6 7 6 7 7 
6 6 6 7 6 6 6 5 4 
7 7 . 6 6 5 6 5 5 4 
8 6 5 8 7 6 5 6 5 
9 5 5 7 7 5 5 5 5 
10 7 6 5 4 6 5 6 6 
11 3 6 6(l89t) 6 3(300t) 6 3(lOOt) 6 4(lOh) 
I. Experiment numbers refer to date experiment was conducted, e.g. 5282: May 28, 1992. 
2. In each period, 1-10, values were drawn with replacement from the uniform distribution on (0, $9.99]. 
3. Volume for number of mugs traded in period 11. Price in cents is shown in parenthesis. 
Table 7 
Volume Traded in UPOA Experiments 
Series 2, Constant Equilibrium l 
Four and Six Minute Mug Trading Periods 
UPOA 
Experiment' 73022 101522 01263) 012833 021933 02243) 
Trading Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume Volume 
Pert od Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed Predicted Observed 
1 6-7 6 6-7 8 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 
2 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 
3 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 
4 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 5 6-7 6 
5 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 
6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 
7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 
8 6-7 6 6-7 5 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 
9 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 
10 6-7 6 6-7 7 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 ·6 6-7 7 
11 6-7 7 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 
12 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 6-7 6 
134 6 2(223«) 6 3(250«) 6 6(350«) 6 5(85«) 6 3(452«) 6 3(215«) 
1. One set of values are drawn with replacement frOlll the unifortll distribution on [0, 19.99J. A randolll constant was added to all values in 
each period 1-12. and the individual assignRents randomized. 
2. Each period was 4 .inutes duration. 
3.  Periods 1-12 were 4 .inutes duration, period 13 was 6 minutes duration to allow more time for mug trading. 
4. Volume for IlUIber of mugs traded in period 13. Price in cents is shown in parenthesis. The price tag. showing S9.95 was left on each 
mug. and this was pointed out to the subjects. 
the mug exchange volume in Tables 6 and 7 with the various objects exchanged in Table 3 
it is clear that our UPDA mechanism results in much less undertrading than was observed 
by KKT. In two of our ten experiments half the mugs (6) trade as predicted by standard 
theory. 
Since earnings in the induced value experiments vary from zero to $34, we can ask 
if there are any income effect on the submitted bids or offers of subjects in the mug 
experiments. Separate regressions of such bids (offers) on earnings for buyers and for 
sellers yield no significant effect of earnings on subject WTP or WTA for a mug (the 
regression coefficients yield t-values of -0.28 for sellers and -0.20 for buyers). 
Each UPDA mug exchange experiment provides a sample of bid and offer prices 
standing at the close of each experiment. Since the exchange mechanism provides full 
opportunity for each subject to adjust his or her bid or offer price to the level needed to 
produce a trade, if a trade is truly desired, the resulting distributions of bids and offers 
provide market incentive-based measures of WTA and WTP that are distinct from the BDM 
measures elicited in Groups 1 and 2 in section I. It is therefore of interest to compare the 
distribution of the Group I WTA prices with the distribution of closing exchange offers, and 
the Group 11 WTP prices with closing exchange bids. We report these t test comparisons 
in Table 8. In these comparisons we use only the bid/offer data for the UPDA experiments 
in which the mug prices were unknown, since this was the treatment condition in the BDM 
data for Groups 1 and 2. Both the offer and the bid distributions are significantly below the 
20 
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Table 8 
Comparison of UPDA Bids, Offers and Exchange 
Prices with Choice Valuations 
Group 1 
WTAs 
Group 2 
WTPs 
t statistic 
prob. level 
t statistic 
prob. level 
Bids 
-9.043 
(0.00) 
Offers 
-8.68 
(0.00) 
Prices 
-4.14 
(0.00) 
0.14 
(0.89) 
T 
corresponding Group 1 WTA and Group 2 WTP distributions. The BDM procedure does 
not yield valuations that are good predictors of the actual bids and offers submitted in the 
iterative UPDA market setting. 
Also in Table 8 we report comparisons of the Group 1 and 2 valuations with the 
sample of all mug prices from the UPDA experiments. These comparisons show that prices 
are significantly below the Group 1 \VI'As, but not the Group 2 WfPs. Thus the WfPs 
based on choice data are a better indicator of the level of exchange prices than are the 
WTAs. Coursey, Hovis and Schutze (1987) report similar findings in their study of the 
disparity between WTA and WTP. 
In a new study using repeated second price auctions to measure WTP and \VI'A for 
goods with close substitutes (candy bars and mugs), Shogren, et al (1994) find no significant 
difference between the avera~e of \VI'A and WTP (or price) for these goods. These 
carefully conducted new experiments cast doubt upon the \VI'A/WTP discrepancy for goods 
with close substitutes, and they reject the KKT hypothesis of an endowment effect. Thus, 
for mugs Shogren et al (1994, p. 265) report WTA/WTP ratios of only 1.08 and 1.05 in two 
treatments on the final three trials 8-10. 
We have no disagreement with their results or conclusions. Their results are not 
inconsistent with our market results because we directly examine trading volume.D.Q1 the 
WTA/WTP discrepancy. It is very important to realize that mean differences between 
WTA and WTP in two situations can be indistinguishable statistically, yet trading volume 
can differ substantially. To see this look at Figure 1. A slight decrease (increase) in the· last 
four accepted bids (offers) would have no discernible effect on the difference between wrA 
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and WTPt on averaget but volume would decrease from 6 to 2 units. SimilarlYt variation in 
the WTA/WTP ratio of 1.08 to 1.05 could in our setting (and that of KKT), yield 
considerable differences in trading volume. The ratio of mean WTA to mean wrP in Table 
4 is only 1.05, but the market trades fullYt (except for the marginal indifferent units that add 
nothing to efficiency). 
Ill. Conclusions and Discussion 
This paper has reexamined the KKT experimental procedures for identifying an 
endowment effect for consumer goods; it is based on a series of individual choice 
experiments, and an independent series of market exchange experiments. 
In our choice experiments we removed all reference to buying, selling and prices and 
reformulated the task uniformly across KKT's three treatment groups as a choice problem. 
Since each experiment in the choice series was an addendum to a prior unrelated market 
experiment in which the subjects earned substantialt but highly variable amounts of money, 
we were able to obtain a measure of any effect on choices due to differential incomes 
earned or to the buyer/seller role in the previous experiment. We found no income or role 
effects. 
Comparing the KKT results with those of our pure choice experiments we find that 
the KKT use of different instructional descriptions -- buyers, sellers, choosers -- may have 
exaggerated seller's WTA, but their hypothesis of an endowment (possession) effect is 
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supported by our choice data. Consequently, although we observe smaller WTA/WTP 
discre~pancies, their qualitative choice results are robust under the replication procedures 
used in this paper. 
The results of our mug exchange experiments parallel those of the choice experiments 
although the methodology is quite different. The training experiments for UPDA, using 
induced valuation, generated a wide disparity in the earnings of both buyers and sellers. 
Since the buyers (sellers) subsequently submit bids (offers) for a mug we could ask whether 
the reported WTP (WTA) was affected by prior income earnings: for neither buyers or 
sellers was there a significant income or 'house money' effect. The theory predicts that, in 
the absence of an income effect, half of the 12 seller's mugs should trade. We observed this 
in two of ten experiments. In seven experiments 2-4 mugs traded, and in one 5, mugs 
traded. This discrepancy is larger (relative to prediction) than observed in the token 
(induced value) UPDA experiments, but not nearly as large as reported by KKT. Our 
UPDA exchange procedures narrow the discrepancy reported by KKT, but do not eliminate 
it. We concur with KKT that there does, indeed, appear to be an undertradini endowment 
effect, although we find the effect to be considerably smaller under our procedures than 
under those of KKT. 
A comparison of the bid (offer) distribution in the UPDA mug exchange experiments 
with the WTP (WTA) distribution in the choice experiments shows that both the bid and 
the offer distributions in exchange are below those in the choice experiments: buyers bid 
less and sellers offer less in actual exchange than is revealed by the BDM procedure.' A 
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similar comparison with the UPDA mug prices reveals that the WfP distribution in the 
choice experiment is a better indicator of market value than the WTA distribution. 
We accept the Shogren et al (1994) finding of no statistically significant difference 
between WTA and WfP (for mugs, candy bars) using second price auction measures. They 
show that the difference does indeed become trivial relative to sampling variability over 
time. But we observe undertrading relative to predictions, which is entirely consistent with 
persistent small statistical differences between WTA and WfP. Consequently, we are 
unable to reject the KKT undertrading hypothesis. Statistical insignificance in the WTA--
WTP space is associated with economically significant reductions in trade. 
As we interpret the evidence, the key hypothesis in KKT that withstands market 
scrutiny is not the disparity between WTA and WTP, but undertrading. 
. , 
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Footnotes 
III 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Support by the Economic Science Laboratory and the National Science Foundation 
is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Jack Knetsch for providing us with copies of 
the collected data from the KKT experiments 6 and 7. 
Actually Thaler expresses the utility property as v(X) < -v(-X) for deviation, X, from 
current wealth, or income. In this form the condition captures the well-known 
KahnemanjTversky hypothesis that the loss function is steeper than the gain function, 
which is consistent with a smooth concave utility function for finite changes in wealth 
(income). It does not capture the apparent WTPjWTA discontinuity at X =0, for 
otherwise continuous Hicksian inverse demand functions. 
In some experiments the ordered individual WTPs and WTAs are crossed and the 
exchange is directly between buyers and sellers at a common clearing price. But in 
these cases it is no longer true "that your decision can have no effect on the price ...," 
as stated in the KKT instructions (p. 178). 
Sometimes it has been suggested that subjects trade in market experiments because 
they think the experimenter expects it and brought them to the lab for this purpose. 
The KKT results are quite contrary to this interpretation. 
One could also use our WTP and WTA data from the BDM experiments to 
determine a hypothetical exchange quantity based upon the BDM elicitation 
procedures. We performed this exercise by crossing the Group 1 WTA with'the 
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Group 2 WTP and found that of 20 predicted trades only 8 would occur. This 
undertrading is consistent with the findings of KKT. If we use the Group 3 data as 
a better estimate of 'true WTA' and cross these with the Group 2 WTP, we still get 
only 12 of a 20 predicted trades. 
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Appendix 
Group _ Person Number 
General Instructions 
This experiment is being financed by research funds. Any money or objects that are 
in your possession at the end of the experiment are yours to take home. As is our strict 
policy with all experiments, there are no deceptions of any kind in this experiment. 
You have been divided into three distinct groups, I, 2, and 3, as indicated at the top 
of your instruction sheet. 
Group 1 consists of people. Each of you has been designated as an owner of 
- . 
the Arizona Wildcat Mug that you see on your desk. Please feel free to examine the mug 
carefully, since you will be asked to choose between retaining your mug, or, instead, 
accepting an additional amount of money to be determined. 
Group 2 consists of __ people. Each of you has been designated as having the 
~t to choose between accepting a mug or retaining an amount of money, to be 
determined, that you have earned in the previous experiment. Please feel free to examine 
the mug that we pass among you to determine if you wish to acquire one. It is identical to 
the mugs owned by those in Group 1. 
Group 3 consists of __ people. Each of you has been designated as having the 
righj, to choose between accepting a mug or accepting an additional amount of money to be 
determined. Please feel free to examine the mug that we pass among you to determine if 
you wish to acquire one. It is identical to the mugs owned by those in Group 1. 
1 
Special Instructions for Each Group 
Group 1. For each of the possible amounts of money listed on your choice sheet 
please indicate whether you wish to 
(l) accept that amount of additional money to replace your mug, or 
(2) retain your mug. 
Group 2. For each of the possible amounts of money listed on your choice sheet 
please indicate whether you wish to 
(1) retain that amount of money, or 
(2) accept one of the mugs to replace this amount of money. 
Group 3. For each of the possible amounts of money listed on your choice sheet 
please indicate whether you wish to 
(1) accept that amount of additional money, or 
(2) accept one of the mugs. 
Instructions for Determinin~ Final Allocation of Money and Mu~s 
After all three groups have marked their choice sheets, a single common amount of 
~~ will be selected at random to determine (according to your choice sheet for that 
amount of money) whether those in group 1 receive that common amount of money or 
retain their mug; whether those in group 2 retain that common amount of money or receive 
a mug; and whether those in group 3 receive that common amount of money or receive a 
mug. The random selection will be made by one of you by drawing a ball from a bingo cage 
containing 23 balls, each marked with a number corresponding to one of the amounts on 
your choice sheet. 
Notice, that each person takes home an outcome -- money or mug -- which 
corresponds to the preferred choice that you expressed. It is, therefore, in your best interest 
to make your choices carefully and accurately according to your true value for the mug. 
1---
----
Group --L Person number 
Choice Sheet 
I will accept this 
additional amount of 
money to replace my mug. 
I will retain 
the mug. 
1. If the amount of money is 
2. If the amount of money is 
3. If the amount of money is 
4. If the amount of money is 
5. If the amount of money is 
6. If the amount of money is 
7. If the amount of money is 
8. If the amount of money is 
9. If the amount of money is 
10. If the amount of money is 
11. If the amount of money is 
12. If the amount of money is 
13. If the amount of money is 
14. If the amount of money is 
15. If the amount of money is 
16. If the amount of money is 
17. If the amount of money is 
18. If the amount of money is 
19. If the amount of money is 
20. If the amount of money is 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
5.50 
6.00 
6.50 
7.00 
7.50 
8.00 
8.50 
9.00 
9.50 
21. If the amount of money is 10.00 
22. If the amount of money is 10.50 
23. If the amount of money is 11.00 
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Group _3_ Person number _ 
Choice Sheet 
I will accept this I will accept 
additional amount of the mug. 
money. 
1. If the amount of money is 0.00 
2. If the amount of money is 0.50 
3. If the amount of money is 1.00 
4. If the amount of money is 1.50 
5. If the amount of money is 2.00 
6. If the amount of money is 2.50 
7. If the amount of money is 3.00 
8. If the amount of money is 3.50 
9. If the amount of money is 4.00 
10. If the amount of money is 4.50 
11. If the amount of money is 5.00 
12. If the amount of money is 5.50 
13. If the amount of money is 6.00 
14. If the amount of money is 6.50 
15. If the amount of money is 7.00 
16. If the amount of money is 7.50 
17. If the amount of money is 8.00 
18. If the amount of money is 8.50 
19. If the amount of money is 9.00 
20. If the amount of money is 9.50 
21. If the amount of money is 10.00 
22. If the amount of money is 10.50 
23. If the amount of money is 11.00 
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